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Non-Technical Summary 
With emissions from land use change representing up to 20 percent of anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas emissions, reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) has been 
proposed as a potentially inexpensive and plentiful source of emission abatement. However, 
critics doubt that REDD credits are environmentally equivalent to domestic emission reductions, 
and suggest an excess supply may disrupt carbon markets. In this context, this paper investigates 
the economic implications of alternative emissions market regulations and future emissions 
reduction commitments, as well as uncertainties in REDD credit supply. Numerical simulations 
with a multi-country equilibrium model of the global emissions market show that unrestricted 
exchange of REDD units reduces the international carbon price by half and cuts Annex I 
compliance costs by roughly one third. Restricting the supply or demand of REDD credits limits 
price impacts, but comes at the cost of economic efficiency. Alternatively, Annex I reduction 
commitments could be increased by almost two thirds at constant carbon prices. Regarding 
uncertainties around the cost and scope of REDD credit supply, we find that both international 
permit prices and Annex I compliance costs are fairly robust to alternative supply functions. 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Da Emissionen aus Landnutzung und tropischer Entwaldung bis zu einem Fünftel der 
anthropogenen Treibhausgasemissionen ausmachen, wird in der aktuellen klimapolitischen 
Debatte die Verringerung von Kohlenstoffemissionen aus Abholzungsaktivitäten als bedeutende 
und kostengünstige Maßnahme des Klimaschutzes vorgeschlagen. Kritiker bezweifeln jedoch, 
dass die Emissionseinsparungen durch vermiedene Entwaldung ökologisch äquivalent zu 
Emissionsvermeidungen in Industrieländern sind und befürchten ein Überschussangebot von 
Emissionszertifikaten. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht die vorliegende Studie die 
ökonomischen Implikationen von Regulierungen des Emissionsmarktes sowie Unsicherheiten 
über das Angebot an Zertifikaten aus vermiedener Entwaldung. Numerische Simulationen mit 
einem Gleichgewichtsmodell des globalen Emissionsmarktes zeigen, dass ein unbeschränkter 
Emissionshandel den internationalen Zertifikatpreis um bis zu 50 Prozent reduzieren würde. Die 
Beschränkung des Angebots von bzw. der Nachfrage nach Zertifikaten limitiert zwar solche 
Preiseffekte, begrenzt jedoch gleichzeitig die ökonomische Effizienz der Klimapolitik. Als 
Alternative könnten Industrieländer ihre Klimaschutzziele mit Hilfe vermiedener Entwaldung um 
fast zwei Drittel erhöhen, ohne den internationalen Zertifikatpreis zu beeinflussen. 
Interactions of Reduced Deforestation and the Carbon Market: 
The Role of Market Regulations and Future Commitments 
 
Niels Anger1,*, Alistair Dixon2 and Erich Livengood2 
 
Abstract. Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) has been proposed as 
a potentially inexpensive and plentiful source of emission abatement to supplement other long-
term climate policies. However, critics doubt that REDD credits are environmentally equivalent 
to domestic emission reductions, and suggest an excess supply may disrupt carbon markets. In 
this context, we investigate the economic implications of emissions market regulations and future 
emissions reduction commitments, as well as uncertainties in REDD credit supply. Numerical 
simulations with a multi-country equilibrium model of the global emissions market show 
unrestricted exchange of REDD units reduces the international carbon price by half and cuts 
Annex I compliance costs by roughly one third. Restricting supply or demand of REDD credits 
reduces price impacts, but comes at the cost of economic efficiency. Alternatively, Annex I 
reduction commitments could be increased by almost two thirds at constant carbon prices. While 
REDD provides large economic benefits for tropical rainforest regions, any REDD policy 
scenario also reduces wealth transfers to traditional CDM host countries through increased 
competition on the supply-side of the carbon market.  
JEL classification: C60, D61, Q23, Q58 
Keywords: Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, Emissions Trading, Deforestation, REDD 
Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank Rachel Holden for helpful research support 
and Andreas Löschel for valuable scientific advice. Funding by the New Zealand Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
1 Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim, Germany  
2 The Marketplace Company Limited (M-Co), Wellington, New Zealand. E-mails: alistair.dixon@m-co.co.nz, 
erich.livengood@m-co.co.nz 
* Corresponding author. Address: Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), P.O. Box 10 34 43, 68 034 
Mannheim, Germany. E-mail: anger@zew.de, niels.anger@gmail.com 
 1
1. Introduction 
 
With emissions from land use change representing up to 20 percent of anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas emissions, reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) has been 
proposed as a potentially inexpensive and plentiful source of emission abatement. Proposals for 
including REDD in the global response to climate change have gained momentum in recent 
years. While the basic premise of REDD is universal to all proposals—that emissions are avoided 
through reductions in the rate of deforestation—virtually all other aspects, from measurement 
methodologies to financing sources, are still being debated in the lead up to the 2009 UN Climate 
Change Conference in Copenhagen. 
A number of REDD proposals identify global funds or emissions trading markets, or both, as 
preferred sources of funding. Advocates of market-based approaches refer to the benefits of 
allocative efficiency and the ability to mobilise the large amounts of capital required to enable the 
potential large emissions reductions. In this context, the Eliasch Review emphasized the 
importance of including the forest sector in international emissions trading schemes, as this 
would substantially reduce the costs of reducing global carbon emissions and lower costs would 
enable more ambitious overall emissions targets (Eliasch, 2008). However, for a REDD market 
mechanism to advance, two key prerequisites will need to be addressed: that REDD credits are 
environmentally equivalent to other compliance units and that REDD units will not “flood” 
emissions markets with excess supply. Regarding the first issue, in particular the adequate 
estimation of reduced emissions remains a challenge and linking distribution of carbon finance to 
countries’ efforts of slowing deforestation rates has been proposed (Combes Motel et al., 2009). 
Regarding the second prerequisite, the European Commission notes that the introduction of 
REDD units into the EU ETS could result in a serious supply and demand imbalance (European 
Commission, 2008). The associated diminishing of carbon price signals could restrain 
technological change towards a low-carbon economy. Also the scope and costs of REDD credit 
supply itself are thus far uncertain: questions about the exact baseline rate of deforestation, 
regional differences in carbon sequestration potential, as well as the opportunity costs of REDD 
(in terms of foregone land use returns and forest product prices) remain unanswered.  
We focus on the carbon market implications of REDD by studying the role of carbon market 
regulations and future emissions reduction commitments, as well as uncertainties in REDD credit 
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supply. Restricting the supply and demand of REDD credits has been proposed to limit a flooding 
of the post-2012 carbon market. Alternatively, an increase in commitments of industrialized 
countries would increase credit demand and thus limit price impacts. Uncertainties in the scope 
and costs of REDD credit supply might substantially alter the associated carbon market effects.  
The economic aspects of international emissions trading have been assessed in a number of 
previous quantitative studies of the Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS (e.g. Weyant and Hill, 1999; 
Böhringer et al., 2005; Klepper and Peterson, 2006). The quantitative economic literature 
assessing deforestation in the context of climate policy is comparably scant. Linking a forestry 
model to a climate-economy model, Sohngen and Mendelsohn (2003) analyze the general role of 
forests in greenhouse gas mitigation, predicting forest sequestration to account for about one third 
of global carbon abatement within the next century. Tavoni et al. (2007) study the contribution of 
forestry management to long-term CO2 stabilization policies, finding that increased forest 
sequestration could significantly lower the global costs of climate policy. Studies focusing on the 
emissions-market implications of REDD include Anger and Sathaye (2008), who provide a first 
assessment of the economic implications of crediting REDD for the post-Kyoto carbon market. 
Cabezas and Keohane (2008) find that forest carbon credits from developing countries, including 
REDD credits, have considerable potential to help limit the costs of compliance with cap-and-
trade systems in the EU and the United States. While the principle economic interactions between 
REDD and carbon markets have been assessed before, these previous studies abstract from three 
important issues: the role of policies which restrict REDD credit demand or supply, the potential 
for expanded commitments through REDD and REDD cost and supply uncertainties.  
Against this background, we study the carbon-market implications of integrating REDD in the 
year 2020. In order to assess the role of market regulations, future commitments and uncertainties 
in REDD supply we employ a multi-country numerical equilibrium model of the global carbon 
market which incorporates marginal cost functions for carbon abatement from reduced 
deforestation. The model covers international emissions trading at the government level as 
facilitated by a post-Kyoto agreement and enables an explicit assessment of international carbon 
permit trade flows generated from the introduction of REDD.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our numerical model 
framework. Section 3 provides a brief economic background on carbon market regulations. The 
quantitative simulation results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Numerical framework 
 
2.1 Model framework 
In order to quantify the carbon market impacts of reducing deforestation we employ a numerical 
equilibrium model of the global carbon market, which incorporates marginal abatement cost 
functions for reduced deforestation. 
 
Accounting for the forestry sector in tropical regions 
In order to represent the response of the forestry sector to changes in future carbon prices, we 
incorporate data from the dynamic partial equilibrium model Generalized Comprehensive 
Mitigation Assessment Process GCOMAP (Sathaye et al., 2005, 2006). This model explicitly 
analyzes the carbon benefits of forestation globally in ten regions and of reducing deforestation in 
four important tropical rainforest regions (FAO, 2007): Africa, South-East Asia, Central America 
and South America. It establishes a reference case level of land use, absent carbon prices, for 
2000 to 2100 before simulating the response of forest land users to changes in prices in forest 
land and products, as well as prices emerging in carbon markets. The model’s objective is to 
estimate the land area that land users would plant above the reference case level, or prevent from 
being deforested, in response to carbon prices. As a result GCOMAP estimates the net changes in 
carbon stocks while meeting the annual demand for timber and non-timber products. In order to 
consider the role of institutional barriers for crediting carbon abatement from reducing 
deforestation GCOMAP accounts for transaction costs of forestry projects and programs 
(hereafter also referred to as projects, see Antinori and Sathaye, 2007). Such transaction costs 
may arise from project search, feasibility studies, as well as negotiation, monitoring and 
verification, regulatory approval, and insurance costs. 
Proposals for the inclusion of REDD credits in international carbon markets have included 
provisions for project-based crediting and for national-level crediting. Under national-level 
crediting, individual nations are compensated for performance in reducing deforestation. In order 
to achieve  reduced national deforestation, nations aggregate projects at the domestic level and 
implement relevant policies and measures. While GCOMAP explicitly models projects, we 
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generalise the resultant regional marginal abatement cost functions to represent regional 
aggregations of national-level crediting cost functions.1 
 
Modelling the global carbon market including reduced deforestation 
In order to quantitatively assess the emissions market impacts of reducing deforestation we 
employ a numerical multi-country, two-sector partial equilibrium model of the global carbon 
market in 2020. For each region, the model incorporates calibrated marginal abatement cost 
functions for energy-intensive and non-energy-intensive sectors. Building on the modelling 
framework of Anger (2007), the core model represents parallel carbon markets for (i) companies 
covered by the EU ETS and emerging schemes outside Europe as well as (ii) post-Kyoto 
governments in 2020 and accounts for emissions reductions via the CDM. For this study, we 
focus on the carbon market for post-Kyoto governmental compliance. The objective of the model 
is to minimize compliance costs of achieving targeted carbon emissions reductions by means of 
international emissions trading. An algebraic model summary is given in Anger (2008). 
To generate marginal abatement cost (MAC) functions by region and sector we use data 
simulated by the well-known energy-system model POLES (Criqui et al., 1999), which explicitly 
covers energy technology options for emissions abatement in various world regions and sectors 
for the base year 2020. In the POLES simulations a sequence of carbon taxes (e.g. 0 to 100 US$ 
per ton of carbon) is imposed on the respective regions, resulting in associated sectoral emissions 
abatement. The coefficients for MAC functions in 2020 are estimated by an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression of tax levels (i.e. marginal abatement costs) on associated emissions 
abatement. Following Böhringer et al. (2005), in order to assure for functional flexibility, a 
polynomial of third degree is chosen as the functional form of MAC functions.2 For region r and 
sector i this results in the following equation (here, EIS and NEIS denote energy-intensive and 
non-energy-intensive sectors, respectively): 
2 3
1, 0 2, 0 3, 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ir ir ir ir ir ir ir ir ir ir irMAC e e e e e e eβ β β− = − + − + −   (1) 
                                                 
 
1 In this paper, it is assumed that the REDD-derived units (as delivered to the market) are environmentally equivalent 
to other trading units. This assumption allows us to discuss exclusively the carbon market impacts of REDD 
integration. 
2 We use the OLS approach as a standard estimation technique, which for our data yields parameter estimations with 
a high overall goodness-of-fit. Clearly alternative estimation approaches and functional forms could be chosen here. 
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with irMAC  as marginal abatement cost in region r  and sector { },i EIS NEIS∈ , 1,irβ , 2,irβ  and 
3,irβ  as marginal abatement cost coefficients, ire0  as baseline emissions level in 2020 and ire  as 
emissions level after abatement. Table 3 in Appendix A shows the resulting least-square 
estimates of MAC coefficients by region and sector in 2020.3 
Following Anger and Sathaye (2008), MAC functions for reducing deforestation are generated by 
imposing a sequence of carbon prices (here: 0 to 100 US$ per ton of carbon) in four tropical 
rainforest regions with the GCOMAP model: Africa, South-East Asia, Central America and 
South America. This results in a sequence of regional net carbon stock changes and the 
corresponding carbon emissions reductions due to avoided deforestation. Based on these price-
quantity pairs we are able to estimate the coefficients of regional MAC functions in 2020 by 
means of an OLS regression. Finally, these MAC coefficients are implemented into the carbon 
market model by covering tropical rainforest areas as explicit model regions. Within this linked 
model framework, tropical rainforest regions may export emissions reduction credits from 
reducing deforestation to industrialised model regions via the global carbon market. Table 4 in 
Appendix A presents the estimated marginal abatement cost coefficients for avoided 
deforestation for the four tropical regions in 2020. 
Table 1 presents the regional groupings of the carbon-market model as well as the classification 
of regions into Annex I regions, CDM host countries and tropical rainforest regions.4 
 
Table 1 Regional participation in 2020 
International emissions  
trading (Annex I) regions 
CDM regions Tropical rainforest 
regions 
EU-27 
Canada  
Japan 
Former Soviet Union 
Pacific OECD 
United States 
Brazil 
China 
India  
Mexico 
South Korea 
Africa 
South-East Asia 
Central America 
South America 
 
                                                 
 
3 The marginal abatement cost coefficients have the following units:  
1,irβ  [(€2005/tCO2)/MtCO2], 2,irβ  [(€2005/tCO2)/(MtCO2)2] and 3,irβ  [(€2005/tCO2)/(MtCO2)3]. 
4 The Pacific OECD region essentially comprises Australia and New Zealand. 
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2.2 Baseline emissions and reduction targets 
Baseline or business-as-usual (BAU) carbon dioxide emissions trajectories are based on van 
Vuuren et al. (2006) who provide a nationally downscaled dataset from the implementation of the 
global IPCC-SRES scenario B2 (IPCC, 2000) into the environmental assessment model IMAGE 
2.2. 
Our study assumes that the framework established under the Kyoto Protocol is retained for the 
2012-2020 period.  In particular, it is assumed that Kyoto mechanisms remain in place and that 
the Parties with commitments are restricted to those parties in Annex I that have commitments 
under Kyoto. Of course, these matters are currently the subject of negotiation. The 2007 UN 
Climate Change Conference’s decision to launch negotiations on strengthening international 
actions to address climate change indicates that at a high level all Parties are willing to take 
actions beyond what they have already agreed to under the Convention and, for some Parties, 
under the Protocol. During and after the conference, many Annex I Parties made statements 
indicating their willingness to take on new and more demanding commitments. 
Our modelling uses post-Kyoto emissions reduction targets for Annex I Parties5 based on public 
announcements through October 2008. Three of the largest Annex I players have yet to make 
declarations akin to those announced by most other Annex I parties: the United States, Russia and 
Ukraine. The United States is not participating in the Kyoto Protocol.  President-elect Barak 
Obama, however advocates a national cap-and-trade scheme for emissions and a target of 
reducing US emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 (Obama and Biden, 2008).   
Russia and the Ukraine are expected to have surplus AAUs at the end of the first commitment 
period.6  However, whether either would agree to deeper reductions than what they agreed under 
Kyoto is open to question.  
The final assumptions about commitments are as follows. If countries announced two targets, 
with the higher depending on full international agreement, the lower target was chosen: The EU 
                                                 
 
5 Consistent with Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol, we refer to Parties assigned commitments under the 
Protocol as “Annex I Parties”.  The Article 3.1 reference to Annex I Parties is a reference to those Parties 
listed in Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  However, it should 
be noted that one Annex I Party, Turkey, was not assigned a target in Annex B of the Protocol. 
6 Refer to Box 11.1, p. 170, Eliasch, 2008. 
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applies its target of 20 percent reduction from 1990 levels, rather than 30 percent;7 the United 
States participates in a post-2012 agreement with a target of a 0 percent reduction in emissions 
relative to 1990 levels; Canada has a target of reducing emissions by 20 percent relative to 2006 
levels by 2020 (Government of Canada, 2008); Japan has a target of reducing emissions by 14 
percent relative to 2005 levels by 2020 (Fukuda, 2008); the Pacific OECD (Australia and New 
Zealand) has a target of 10 percent reduction relative to 2000 levels by 2020;8 and the former 
Soviet Union has a target of no increase over current projections for 2020 emissions.9 An 
overview of baseline emissions and reduction targets is provided in Table 5 of Appendix A. 
 
2.3 Policy scenarios  
In the following, we present our policy scenarios of integrating REDD into the intergovernmental 
carbon market in 2020. The set of scenarios is summarised in Table 2. 
First, the international emissions trading (IET) scenario represents intergovernmental trading of 
carbon permits at the core emission reduction commitments laid out in the previous section and, 
for comparability, abstracts from CDM access for industrialized countries. Our Base Case 
scenario includes the option of unlimited CDM offset credit imports by Annex I regions from 
undertaking emission reduction projects in the developing world as well as core commitments, 
but assumes a carbon market that develops without crediting reduced deforestation. Against this 
Base Case, scenario REDD describes the access for industrialized economies to carbon abatement 
options in tropical rainforest regions via REDD credits. This scenario tests the impact of 
unlimited REDD fungibility and represents the maximum credit exchange case. It also provides a 
metric against which the other policy scenarios can be measured.  
                                                 
 
7 At the 2007 European Spring Council, the EU set a unilateral target of 20 percent emissions reductions 
relative to 1990 levels for 2020.  “Provided that other developed countries commit themselves to 
comparable emission reductions and economically more advanced developing countries contribute 
adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities” the target will be increased to 30 
percent”(Council of the European Union, 2007). 
8 Note that this was the target initially proposed by Garnaut (2008). In the Final report, which was 
published after these parameters were selected, the recommended target is a 25 percent reduction relative 
to 2000 levels by 2020 “so long as the components of that agreement add up to the concentrations 
objective [of 450 ppm CO2e]” (page xiv).  If the objective is 550 ppm CO2e the Final report recommends a 
target of 10 percent below 2000 levels by 2020. 
9 As assumed in Anger and Sathaye (2007). 
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Table 2 Carbon market scenarios for 2020 
 
Managed (or restricted) exchange of REDD units has been proposed to mitigate concerns about 
both the quality of REDD units and the impact of REDD units on emissions markets. One way of 
restricting the fungibility of REDD units is by imposing demand restrictions on market 
participants via a supplementarity requirement that limits the proportion of emission reduction 
commitments which can be offset by imported units (scenario REDD_DEM). Another approach 
to limit total credits from reduced deforestation available to the market is to impose supply 
restrictions, in which supplying regions are only able to export a specified quantity of units 
(scenario REDD_SUP). For our demand-side restriction, each region subject to commitments is 
restricted to importing a maximum of 20 percent of the required emissions reductions in 2020.  
For the supply-side restriction scenario, the total export of REDD units is limited to 20 percent of 
the aggregate Annex I emission reduction requirements in 2020. Each REDD supply region is 
restricted to exporting a share of these units proportional to the REDD region’s share of current 
term deforestation emissions. 
Institutional 
scenario 
International 
emissions 
trading 
REDD 
access 
REDD 
restriction 
Commitment 
levels 
IET 
Governmental 
emissions 
trading 
BASE CASE 
No – 
REDD 
Core 
REDD_EXP 
Unlimited No 
Expanded 
REDD_DEM Core 
REDD_DEM_EXP 
Demand-side 
restriction 
20% of Annex I 
region’s 
reduction 
requirement in 
2020 
Expanded 
REDD_SUP Core 
REDD_SUP_EXP 
Governmental 
emissions 
trading 
including the 
CDM 
Supply-side 
Restriction 
Equivalent (in 
aggregate) in 
supply terms to 
the demand 
restriction 
Expanded 
 9
For our three REDD scenario cases, we also study increased demand for REDD units through 
expanded commitments (represented in scenarios REDD_EXP, REDD_DEM_EXP and 
REDD_SUP_EXP). In each scenario, for comparability Annex I commitment levels are expanded 
by an extent that yields a similar carbon price as our Base Case scenario, which assumed core 
commitments and the absence of REDD credits on the carbon market. 
 
 
3. Economic Background 
 
This section aims to explain the theoretical economic intuition of carbon-market impacts 
associated with the REDD policy scenarios described above. For brevity, we focus on the two 
most relevant cases: restrictions of supply and demand of REDD credits. We further study the 
implications of expanding commitments for these two market regulations. 
Figure 1 describes the international market for REDD credits, denoting upward sloping credit 
supply by tropical rainforest regions with S and downward sloping credit demand by Annex I 
countries with D, as well as prices for REDD credits by P and quantities by Q, respectively. The 
carbon-market implications of restrictions on the demand for REDD credits are as follows. The 
implementation of a demand limit changes the demand curve to D’, which results in a new 
market equilibrium with a lower price level and a lower quantity of REDD credits. This new 
market situation implies diminished producer rents for the supplying tropical rainforest regions 
(by the aggregate area a + b in Figure 1) and augmented consumer rents for the purchasing 
Annex I countries (by the aggregate area a - c in Figure 1). The overall deadweight loss through 
demand-side REDD market regulation is thus given by areas b and c.   
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Figure 1 Implications of restricting REDD credit demand (scenario REDD_DEM)  
D’
P
Q
S
D
Demand limit  
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the consequences of restrictions on the supply of REDD credits. The 
implementation of a supply limit alters the supply curve to S’, which results in a new market 
equilibrium with a higher price level and a lower quantity of REDD credits.  
 
Figure 2 Implications of restricting REDD credit supply (scenario REDD_SUP)   
Q
P
D
S
S’
Supply limit  
 
a
c
b 
d
f
e 
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This new market situation implies higher producer rents of tropical rainforest regions (by the 
aggregate area d - f in Figure 2) and lower consumer rents of Annex I countries (by the aggregate 
area d + e in Figure 2). The overall deadweight loss through supply-side REDD market 
regulation is thus given by areas e and f.   
 
We now turn to the carbon-market implications of expanding emission reduction commitments of 
Annex I countries for the two cases of market regulation. Figure 3 shows that for a carbon market 
with restrictions on demand for REDD credits, expanding Annex I commitment levels induces an 
upward shift of the REDD credit demand curve only within the range of the demand limit. As a 
consequence, the carbon-market equilibrium remains unchanged by the commitment expansion.  
 
Figure 3 Implications of expanding Annex I commitments in the context of restricted REDD 
credit demand (scenario REDD_DEM_EXP)   
D’
P
Q
D
Demand limit
S
P
 
 
Finally, Figure 4 illustrates that in a carbon market with restrictions on the supply of REDD 
credits, expanding commitments induces an upward shift of the REDD credit demand curve to 
the new demand function D’. This results in a new market situation with a higher price level but 
– due to the supply limit – unchanged quantity of REDD credits. Consequently, the economic 
rents of tropical rainforest regions are augmented, while those of Annex I countries are 
diminished. 
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Figure 4 Implications of expanding Annex I commitments in the context of restricted REDD 
credit supply (scenario REDD_SUP_EXP)  
Q
P
D
S
S’
Supply limit
D’
 
 
 
 
4. Simulation results 
 
4.1 Results and assessment for core commitments 
This section presents and discusses the simulation results for the core emissions reduction 
commitments of Annex I countries across the alternative policy scenarios. A complete set of 
quantitative results is presented in Appendix B. 
We begin our quantitative analysis by assessing the carbon price impacts of alternative climate 
policy designs in the year 2020. The carbon constraints of Annex I countries result in an 
international permit price of roughly €38 per ton of CO2 if only governmental emissions trading 
is allowed (scenario IET)10. The global carbon price decreases to €16 under our Base Case when 
                                                 
 
10 The commitment levels assumed for our modelling have been proposed by Parties with the expectation that 
inexpensive CDM emissions reductions will be available to offset some developed country emissions.  As a 
consequence, the IET scenario is provided to illustrate the sensitivity of the model. 
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we account for unlimited access by industrialized countries to the CDM, as the Annex I region is 
able to import carbon credits from low-cost emission abatement options in developing countries 
(scenario BASE CASE). This finding is consistent with previous studies (see e.g. Klepper and 
Peterson, 2006; Böhringer et al., 2005). 
Against this background, Figure 5 illustrates the carbon price impacts of introducing REDD into 
a future climate policy regime. We find that the international permit price is reduced by 45 
percent relative to the Base Case (which only includes the CDM) to roughly €9 per ton of CO2 if 
Annex I countries are granted unlimited access to carbon credits from avoided deforestation 
(scenario REDD). This price impact reveals the greater availability of carbon abatement options 
from REDD with lower marginal abatement costs than those CDM options used in the original 
carbon market equilibrium. This reflects the relatively low returns on land use and forest products 
in tropical regions and resulting low opportunity cost of reducing deforestation.. The increased 
competition on the supply side of the emissions market thus decreases the international permit 
price to the level of the REDD credit price. 
 
Figure 5 Prices for international carbon permits and REDD credits by scenario 
Carbon prices in 2020 (EUR per ton of CO2)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
BASE CASE REDD REDD_SUP REDD_DEM
International permit price
REDD credit price
 
 
Figure 5 further shows that restricting supply or demand for REDD credits to 20 percent of each 
Annex I region’s emission reduction requirement in the year 2020 limits the price-decreasing 
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impacts of introducing REDD. We find that the international permit price generated under both 
the scenario REDD_SUP and scenario REDD_DEM is roughly €13 per ton of CO2, which 
represents a more moderate price decrease of 20 percent compared to the Base Case. The reason 
is that in both cases the amount of low-cost REDD credits on the market is lower than in the case 
of unlimited REDD fungibility. However, in the case of a demand-side restriction the REDD 
credit price decreases substantially to €4 per ton of CO2: a REDD demand restriction thus drives 
a wedge between the REDD credit price and the international permit price. 
We now turn to the total costs for complying with the assumed emissions reduction commitments 
across alternative policy designs in the year 2020. Figure 6 shows that total compliance costs 
reflect the carbon-price effects discussed above, including the cost-decreasing effect of unlimited 
CDM access. Most importantly, we find that integrating reduced deforestation on the 
international carbon market yields large economic efficiency gains, decreasing Annex I 
compliance costs by more than one third. 
 
Figure 6 Aggregate compliance costs for the Annex I region by scenario 
Annex I compliance costs in 2020 (million EUR)
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As noted above, the potential reduction in carbon price resulting from allowing unrestricted 
REDD access has raised concerns that this could cause critical delays in effecting crucial 
technological changes, such as the development of carbon capture and storage, necessary for 
achieving long term emissions targets.  For this reason, restrictions on either the flows of REDD 
units onto emissions markets (supply restrictions) or the use of REDD unit for compliance 
purposes (demand restrictions or “supplementarity”) have been proposed. 
Against this background, Figure 6 and Figure 7 together indicate that mitigation of REDD carbon 
price impacts through the restriction of REDD supply or demand occurs at the expense of 
economic efficiency.  While the total compliance costs for industrialized countries are still 
diminished through the introduction of REDD as compared to CDM access only, the cost savings 
from REDD are considerably lower when REDD supply and demand are regulated. However, 
Figure 6 shows that compliance costs are significantly lower in the case of limited REDD 
demand as compared to the case of restricted supply - Annex I cost savings from REDD amount 
to 30 percent for a demand limit, but only 15 percent for the supply limit. This central result can 
be explained as follows: While restricting REDD demand decreases the REDD credit price, 
thereby reducing the producer surplus for tropical rainforest regions and increasing the consumer 
surplus of Annex I regions, restricting REDD supply has the opposite effect (compare again 
Figure 1 and Figure 2). In other words, the wedge between the REDD and the international 
permit price caused by a demand-side restriction decreases the total costs of REDD credit imports 
for Annex I regions and thus induces lower total compliance costs than a supply-side regulation. 
In conclusion, of the two options for maintaining the international permit price, the option that 
best limits Annex I compliance costs is restricting REDD demand. However, demand restriction 
is the less desirable option for developing countries because they earn less from REDD activity, 
as shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Net economic benefits (revenues less costs) by rainforest region and scenario 
Net economic benefits for rainforest regions in 2020 (million EUR)
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We now discuss the implications for the international trade of carbon permits. Figure 8 presents 
regional net REDD credit exports across our policy scenarios. It shows that for unlimited REDD 
fungibility, Africa is the dominant credit exporter to Annex I countries, followed by South 
America. In comparison, the tropical regions of South-East Asia and Central America play a 
rather minor role on the market for REDD credits. The reason for Africa’s dominance is the 
relatively low opportunity costs of abatement in this region combined with a large quantitative 
potential of reducing deforestation (in terms of forest area and projected deforestation activity).11 
The situation is somewhat different under restricted REDD supply which results in a REDD price 
equal to the international permit price.  This results in greater REDD activity in the regions other 
than Africa because competition between REDD regions is restricted (each supplying region has 
its own cap) and a higher resultant price leads to increased REDD activity in other regions.  
Under this scenario REDD credits from Africa are roughly equal to South American exports and 
the level of REDD activity relative to business-as-usual is similar in all tropical rainforest 
                                                 
 
11 Some readers may note that not all nations currently possess sufficient institutional or technological 
capacity to participate effectively in a REDD regime. The potential inability to develop REDD programs in 
some locales needs to be taken into account when considering the large number of REDD credits 
generated from Africa in our modelling. 
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regions. Table 7 in Appendix B presents the corresponding regional reductions of carbon 
emissions. 
 
Figure 8 Net exports (exports less imports) of REDD credits by region and scenario 
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As well as improving overall efficiency by reducing Annex I compliance costs, the other key 
impact of REDD is to reduce the activity of the CDM through increased credit supply 
competition, as shown in Figure 9.  Base Case CDM credit exports are reduced by around a half 
under unrestricted REDD access and by around a quarter under the supply and demand 
restrictions.  This occurs because some REDD emissions abatement occurs at a lower marginal 
cost than conventional CDM abatement options. 
The substitution of REDD exports to Annex I countries for CDM credits translates into 
substantially lower net benefits to CDM host regions, as shown in 0 of in Appendix B.  In 
particular, under the unrestricted REDD access scenario (Scenario REDD) net economic benefits 
to CDM host regions drop to roughly one third of that for the Base Case without REDD, and 
decrease to less than two thirds in the case of supply or demand restrictions. This suggests that 
the combination of unlimited REDD access with no increase in Annex I commitments may 
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significantly reduce CDM activity because of the greater economic attractiveness of REDD for 
Annex I regions. 
 
Figure 9 Net credit exports (exports less imports) of CDM host regions by scenario 
Aggregate net CDM credit exports in 2020 (Mt CO2)
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4.2 Results for expanded commitments 
This section presents and discusses the simulation results for expanded emission reduction 
commitments of Annex I countries across the alternative policy scenarios. Our central findings 
are illustrated in the figures set out in this section (the complete set of quantitative results is 
presented in Table 5). 
Taking advantage of the low cost of REDD abatement allows Annex I commitments to be 
extended by a significant degree with a consequent increase in emission reductions.  As noted in 
Section 2.3, we have maintained the international carbon permit price at the same level in our 
expanded commitments scenarios as under the Base Case. 
Relative to our Base Case, unrestricted access to REDD allows Annex I commitments to increase 
by 62 percent.  This results in an average Annex I emissions target 32 percent lower than 
business as usual, or 24 percent lower than 1990 levels.  This is approaching the lower end of the 
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range of 25-40 percent reductions vs. 1990 levels identified by the IPCC as necessary to achieve 
a  450ppm CO2e concentration target (Gupta et al., 2007). 
Figure 10 shows expanded commitment levels for each of our policy scenarios.  With REDD unit 
supply or demand restrictions Annex I commitments are only increased by 20 percent relative to 
the Base Case for constant international permit prices. 
 
Figure 10 Core and expanded Annex I commitments levels by scenario 
Core and expanded emission reduction targets 
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Despite the constant carbon price across scenarios, expanding commitments increases compliance 
costs for Annex I as more units are purchased. Figure 11 shows that compliance costs for 
expanded commitments with unrestricted REDD access are approximately double the compliance 
costs in the Base Case. With REDD demand and supply restrictions fewer units are purchased 
leading to compliance costs around a third lower than with unrestricted access to REDD – but 
abatement is lower as well.  The compliance cost of expanded targets is around a fifth lower with 
REDD demand restrictions as compared with supply restrictions. As previously, this is because 
the impact of REDD demand restrictions is to lower the REDD unit price – as shown in Figure 12 
– and since the REDD unit price is not increased by expanded targets, the overall cost of 
purchasing units is lower. 
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Figure 11 Aggregate compliance costs for the Annex I region by scenario 
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Figure 12 Prices for international carbon permits and REDD credits by scenario 
Carbon prices in 2020 (EUR per ton of CO2)
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The impact of increased Annex I commitments under the unrestricted REDD access scenario is to 
increase exports of REDD credits relative to the core commitments scenario (scenario REDD), as 
shown in Figure 13.  This is because the higher unit price means abatement that was not 
economic under core commitments becomes economic under the higher emissions price that 
results from increased commitments. 
Figure 11 also shows that REDD credit exports remain fixed with expanded commitments under 
both the supply and demand restrictions. These results correspond to the economic intuition in 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 in Section 3. Figure 3 illustrated that the impact of expanded commitments 
with a demand restriction is to shift the demand curve outward within the range of the restriction, 
resulting in unchanged cost and exports of REDD units. Figure 4 showed the effect of a supply 
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restriction is an outwards shift of the REDD demand curve but with supply unchanged, which 
results in an increase in the price for REDD units. The effect of the increased price under the 
latter scenario is a transfer of rents from Annex I to REDD-supplying nations. 
 
Figure 13 Net exports (exports less imports) of REDD credits of rainforest regions by scenario 
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4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
In the introduction we emphasized the importance of uncertainties around the cost and scope of 
REDD credit supply. As these uncertainties are derived from both REDD policy choices and the 
uncertainties in the forestry data input we have utilised, we now provide a sensitivity analysis 
around REDD marginal abatement cost. The corresponding simulation results are presented in 
Appendix C. 
The analysis illustrates the dynamics of the carbon market in 2020 over a broad range of REDD 
costs. The low-cost scenario (REDD_MAC) halves the marginal costs of REDD units supplied at 
any given REDD quantity as compared to the REDD scenario, while the high-cost scenario 
(REDD_MAC+) doubles the cost of supplied REDD units at any given REDD quantity compared 
to the REDD scenario. These two scenarios are otherwise identical to the REDD scenario and 
thus demonstrate the impact of a range of REDD cost assumptions on carbon prices, associated 
compliance costs, and transfers.12   
                                                 
 
12 The double/half supply levels were selected, in part, to be consistent with modelling done by the 
Environmental Defense Fund (Cabezas and Keohane, 2008). 
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We find that international carbon permit prices are relatively robust to the tested changes in 
REDD supply functions. As shown in Table 13, the impact on the international carbon price is 
within the +/- 20 percent range—a level that is moderate given the large swing in REDD supply 
costs. This holds true for both core commitments and expanded commitments. The impact on 
CDM host countries, however, is greater with CDM exporters receiving a windfall of an 
additional 50 percent net economic benefit with REDD supply costs increased, and losing 40 
percent of the economic benefit of the REDD scenario with REDD supply costs decreased.  
Impacts on CDM supplying regions are somewhat less dramatic under expanded commitments 
with the net economic benefit within a +/- 35 percent range of the benefit under the REDD 
expanded commitments scenario. The corresponding total compliance cost impacts are provided 
in Table 14. 
In order to account for different levels of supply under expanded targets, two additional scenarios 
are modelled at the expanded commitment level for unlimited REDD access (i.e. at a 62% 
expansion of core commitments). Again, marginal REDD supply costs are halved and doubled at 
each REDD quantity in these scenarios, which are denoted REDD_MAC_EXP and 
REDD_MAC+_EXP respectively. We find that also for expanded commitments the carbon price 
impacts of alternative supply costs remain within the 20 percent range. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Without alterations to currently proposed Annex I commitments, an unrestricted integration of 
REDD units into the post-Kyoto international emissions market may approximately halve the 
international price of carbon in 2020.  While this reduction leads to substantial compliance cost 
savings for developed countries in the short term, the incentives for increased domestic 
abatement are decreased in the medium term and development of clean infrastructure and 
technologies may be delayed. 
Another potential barrier to unrestricted integration could include opposition from CDM 
supplying nations, who as the modelling shows stand to lose a large portion of their net economic 
benefit from the CDM compared to the Base Case.  Some developed countries may also oppose 
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the significant wealth transfers to non-Annex I nations when these nations are not subject to 
emission reduction commitments. 
Demand-side and supply-side restrictions on the import of REDD units into compliance markets 
can support prices, but would fail to encourage further progress toward more ambitious GHG 
reduction goals by simultaneously restricting economic efficiency. While demand-side 
restrictions will please the cost conscious in developed countries, maintaining a reasonably high 
international price of carbon while enabling REDD units to be acquired at a mere third of that 
price may cause disaffection among supplying nations. 
As negotiators prepare for Copenhagen 2009, consideration should be given to another option: 
expanding commitments beyond what Annex I Parties may currently be contemplating.   The cost 
savings to Annex I Parties which would occur with REDD integration could justifiably be 
reinvested in deeper commitments. 
In investigating a scenario which could fully mitigate the concerns over lost CDM income and a 
dampening of the international carbon price signal, we describe an option which is calibrated to 
yield a carbon price similar to what occurs in the Base Case.  While the additional 60 percent 
reduction from core commitments13 for Annex I is ambitious, it takes full advantage of the 
efficiency gains of intersectoral trading between domestic Annex I, CDM, and REDD emissions 
reductions.  The result is GHG mitigation which approaches the lower end of the IPCC range of a 
25-40 percent reduction in emissions allowances to Annex I nations compared to 1990 levels to 
stabilise atmospheric carbon at 450ppm CO2e (Gupta et al, 2007). 
The total costs for such expanded commitments are considerable. Annex I compliance costs 
increase approximately 85 percent with additional reductions of this magnitude. Transfer 
payments from Annex I to CDM and REDD nations increase to a level two-and-a-half times that 
with core commitments. Clearly, a lower expansion of Annex I targets would be possible at 
constant compliance costs. 
                                                 
 
13 Our Base Case assumed aggregate reductions (includes US) of 20 percent from 2020 BAU (‐10 percent 
vs. 1990) levels while our expanded commitments scenario results in reductions of 32 percent from 2020 
BAU (‐24 percent vs. 1990).  The Base Case reductions are at the upper end of the 550ppm CO2e reduction 
scenario, and best represent a level of effort in line with no action to depart from baseline by non‐Annex I 
nations. 
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The opportunities presented are significant; however caution is required when considering the 
results of modelling efforts in general.  While adequate for comparing alternative policy 
scenarios, our model is not deterministic and does not aim at predicting prices explicitly.  
Updating this model with improved understanding of forest and domestic abatement costs will 
further improve its currency, but factors such as technological change or feedback-effects on non- 
CO2 markets are beyond this study. 
While the modelling in this paper illustrates the benefits and costs of incorporating REDD into 
international carbon markets, whether a viable REDD supply will actually materialise still 
remains uncertain at the time of writing. Significant concerns around the permanence of 
mitigation and the environmental integrity of REDD units will need to be successfully addressed 
in the design of a REDD regime. Even once these issues have been addressed, natural factors and 
market conditions will impact the supply of REDD units. 
This study shows that if these issues are addressed, REDD provides a large opportunity for both 
economic efficiency gains and significant future emission reductions for combating global 
climate change. Annex I emissions reduction commitments can increase to close to the range 
recommended by the IPCC at carbon price levels that would prevail with access to the CDM 
only, if Annex I Parties have unrestricted access to REDD units for meeting their commitments.  
However, Annex I compliance costs would increase significantly as a result of the substantial 
transfer of funding to tropical forest countries through the purchase of REDD units.  Compliance 
costs could, of course, be limited with less ambitious expansions of Annex I targets. 
This raises an essential issue for the post-2012 negotiations: are Annex I Parties willing to 
increase their commitments (and financial transfers to developing countries) while absorbing 
substantial increases in compliance costs?  Unrestricted access to REDD coupled with Annex I 
targets that reflect this large source of emission reductions would provide significant benefits in 
terms of increased mitigation and potential poverty alleviation.  However, Annex I Parties may 
not be willing to agree to the increased costs (or the level of commitments) without 
corresponding concessions from developing countries.  
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Appendix A Marginal abatement cost functions and emission market assumptions 
 
Table 3 Marginal abatement cost coefficients for conventional abatement options (€2005) 
Energy-intensive sectors (EIS) Non-energy-intensive sectors (NEIS) Region 
β1,EIS,r β2,EIS,r β3,EIS,r β1,NEIS,r β2,NEIS,r β3,NEIS,r 
Austria 21.1480 -3.3392 0.8094 11.4095 2.8620 -0.1012 
Belgium 2.8430 -0.0984 0.0026 5.8176 0.1881 0.0176 
Denmark 11.1840 -0.5817 0.0235 59.6656 -12.7515 5.7710 
Finland 3.0710 -0.0566 0.0032 75.2956 -14.0624 1.5541 
France 0.9439 -0.0078 0.0002 1.5191 0.0784 -0.0007 
Germany 0.3668 -0.0017 0.0000 0.9417 0.0111 0.0000 
Greece 1.8843 -0.0118 0.0005 30.8964 -1.6083 0.3375 
Ireland 3.0683 -0.1585 0.0110 23.4662 -0.3972 0.2788 
Italy 0.9413 0.0036 0.0001 2.5992 0.1511 -0.0005 
Netherlands 0.8665 0.0393 -0.0004 10.9863 -0.4063 0.1088 
Portugal 11.0386 -0.5740 0.0175 56.1921 -9.2007 2.4941 
Spain 0.8090 -0.0097 0.0002 10.3924 -0.4192 0.0137 
Sweden 7.7433 -0.2814 0.0102 12.5684 1.7070 0.3807 
United Kingdom 0.4066 -0.0022 0.0000 1.4731 0.0244 -0.0001 
Eastern Europe 0.1466 0.0001 0.0000 0.7554 0.0008 0.0000 
Canada 0.2766 0.0007 0.0000 0.8316 0.0044 0.0001 
Japan 0.2666 0.0023 0.0000 1.3130 0.0313 -0.0001 
Former Soviet 
Union 0.0218 0.0002 0.0000 0.1075 0.0004 0.0000 
Pacifc OECD  0.7244 -0.0094 0.0001 1.8636 -0.0315 0.0005 
United States 0.0245 0.0000 0.0000 0.1453 0.0000 0.0000 
Brazil 11.5525 -0.0631 0.0001 4.1163 0.0006 0.0004 
China 0.0129 0.0000 0.0000 0.3052 -0.0004 0.0000 
India 0.0960 -0.0001 0.0000 2.2685 -0.0346 0.0008 
Mexico 0.0116 0.0191 -0.0001 0.3852 0.0204 -0.0001 
South Korea 0.3405 -0.0011 0.0000 4.1598 -0.0027 0.0010 
 
Table 4 Marginal abatement cost coefficients for reduced deforestation (€2005) 
Region β1,r β2,r β3,r 
Africa 0.01807 -0.00011 0.00000 
South-East Asia 0.20949 -0.00095 0.00002 
Central America 0.23116 -0.00114 0.00002 
South America 0.02841 -0.00002 0.00000 
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Table 5 Baseline emissions and emission reduction targets by region in 2020 (announced commitments in bold numbers) 
Region 
CO2 emissionsin 1990 
(Mt CO2) 
CO2 emissionsin 2000 
(Mt CO2) 
CO2 emissionsin 2005 
(Mt CO2) 
CO2 emissions in 2020 
(Mt CO2) 
Reduction 
requirements 
in 2020 
(% vs. 1990) 
Reduction 
requirements 
in 2020 
(% vs. 2000) 
Reduction 
requirements 
in 2020 
(% vs. 2005) 
Reduction 
requirements 
in 2020 
(% vs. 2020) 
Austria 59.6   74.1 24.3   39.1 
Belgium 110.1   143.9 19.6   38.5 
Denmark 50.4   59.1 31.3   41.4 
Finland 54.2   65.2 13.0   27.7 
France 377.3   421.0 13.0   22.1 
Germany 988.3   963.0 31.3   29.5 
Greece 75.8   106.1 -8.7   22.3 
Ireland 33.0   49.8 1.7   34.9 
Italy 417.5   511.7 18.7   33.7 
Netherlands 158.5   201.8 18.3   35.8 
Portugal 43.6   74.7 -10.4   35.6 
Spain 225.8   351.1 0.0   35.7 
Sweden 49.8   49.8 9.6   9.6 
United Kingdom 577.4   646.5 23.9   32.0 
Eastern Europe 1042.1   1110.4 8.8   14.4 
EU-27 4263.4   4828.1 20.0  27.2 
Canada 427.5 521.8 578.5 602.3 -8.3  20.0 23.2 
Japan 1091.4 1225.6 1271.1 1168.3 -0.2  14.0 6.4 
Former Soviet Union 3605.4 2311.4 2401.0 2764.3 23.3  0.0 
Pacific OECD 292.0 369.2 420.4 446.1 -13.8 10.0  25.5 
United States 4890.8 5766.2 6237.5 6500.0 0.0   24.8 
Brazil 214.0   838.2 -   - 
China 2495.7   6491.2 -   - 
India 616.1   2934.5 -   - 
Mexico 309.0   733.7 -   - 
South Korea 253.7   853.0 -   - 
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Appendix B Core simulation results 
 
Table 6 Total compliance costs by region and scenario (million €2005) 
Scenario
Region 
IET CDM REDD REDD_ SUP 
REDD_ 
DEM 
REDD_ 
MAC 
REDD_ 
MAC 
REDD
EXP 
REDD_ 
SUP 
EXP 
REDD_ 
DEM 
EXP 
REDD_ 
MAC 
EXP 
REDD_ 
MAC+ 
EXP 
EU-27 34708.6 17874.3 10415.2 14667.4 12380.5 8300.4 12476.4 30633.1 22007.7 18927.3 25018.7 35338.9 
Canada 2630.4 1659.1 1027.2 1398.8 1157.7 831.8 1211 3013.9 2097.7 1770.9 2495.5 3437.5 
Japan 624.6 724.9 495.6 640.6 512.2 410.7 570.3 1452.3 960.2 784.8 1227.5 1626.1 
Former Sov. 
Un. -14198 -3308.6 -1173.6 -2248.4 -2228.6 -768.3 -1650 -3297.4 -3308.5 -3308.6 -2273.5 -4298.3 
Pacific OECD 2067.1 1499.6 898.1 1250.5 1052.5 717.9 1071.1 2606.2 1858 1590.7 2147.5 2973.5 
United States 28428.5 19195.1 11977.6 16264 13479.4 9697.1 14108.4 34843.3 24261.3 20486.2 28927.9 39622.6 
Annex I 
regions 54261.2 37644.4 23640.1 31972.9 26353.7 19189.6 27787.2 69251.4 47876.4 40251.3 57543.6 78700.3 
Brazil  -40.1 -11.7 -25.3 -25.1 -7.1 -17.6 -40 -40.1 -40.1 -25.6 -54.9 
China  -11353 -3231.1 -7116.9 -7040.3 -1939.4 -4885.4 -11307.8 -11353 -11353 -7214.5 -15513.4 
South Korea  -412.4 -119.9 -259.8 -257 -72.8 -179.6 -410.8 -412.4 -412.4 -263.3 -564.2 
Mexico  -495.2 -184.9 -342.3 -339.4 -124.1 -255.1 -493.6 -495.2 -495.2 -346 -636.8 
India  -1496.8 -416 -921.4 -911.2 -250.5 -629.2 -1490.4 -1496.8 -1496.8 -934.3 -2093.5 
CDM regions  -13797.5 -3963.6 -8665.7 -8573 -2393.9 -5966.9 -13742.6 -13797.5 -13797.5 -8783.7 -18862.8 
Africa  -5136.8 -2917 -718.7 -2505.2 -6124.7 -14113.1 -3790.7 -718.7 -8805.8 -16213.2 
South-East Asia  -180.4 -389.8 -38.9 -13.8 -193.9 -617.6 -617.3 -38.9 -58.3 -610.6 
Central America  -162.7 -276.9 -35.1 -24.9 -171.3 -556.8 -374.7 -35.1 -95.1 -539.1 
South America  -1323.8 -2394.6 -285.5 -202.9 -1393.7 -4530 -3275.1 -285.5 -773.7 -4386.1 
REDD regions  -6803.7 -5978.3 -1078.2 -2746.8 -7883.6 -19817.5 -8057.8 -1078.2 -9732.9 -21749 
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Table 7 Emission reductions by region and scenario (% of  BaU emissions) 
Scenario 
Region 
IET CDM REDD REDD_SUP 
REDD_DE
M 
REDD 
EXP 
REDD_SU
P 
EXP 
REDD_DE
M 
EXP 
EU-27 15.2 7.2 4 5.8 5.8 7.2 7.2 7.2
Canada 20.4 10.6 6.3 8.8 8.7 10.6 10.6 10.6
Japan 8.8 4.5 2.7 3.8 3.7 4.5 4.5 4.5
Former Sov. 
Un. 22.1 12.8 8.6 11 11 12.8 12.8 12.8
Pacific OECD 27.9 9.5 4.3 6.9 6.9 9.5 9.5 9.5
United States 23.9 11.9 6.6 9.6 9.5 11.8 11.9 11.9
Brazil 0 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
China 0 20.6 10.7 16.3 16.2 20.6 20.6 20.6
South Korea 0 5.7 3 4.5 4.5 5.7 5.7 5.7
Mexico 0 6.4 4.3 5.5 5.5 6.4 6.4 6.4
India 0 6.1 3 4.6 4.6 6.1 6.1 6.1
Africa 0 0 77.9 19.3 34.3 94.9 19.3 34.3
South-East Asia 0 0 10.7 15.8 4.9 20 19.3 4.9
Central America 0 0 22.5 19.3 10.3 42.2 19.3 10.3
South America 0 0 20.4 19.3 9.3 38.2 19.3 9.3
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Table 8 Carbon prices by credit type and scenario (€2005 per ton of CO2) 
Scenario 
Type 
IET CDM REDD REDD_ SUP 
REDD_ 
DEM 
REDD_ 
MAC 
REDD_ 
MAC+ 
REDD
EXP 
REDD_ 
SUP 
EXP 
REDD_ 
DEM 
EXP 
REDD_ 
MAC 
EXP 
REDD_ 
MAC+ 
EXP 
International 
permit price 37.9 15.7 8.6 12.5 12.5 6.7 10.4 15.7 15.7 15.7 12.6 18.4
CDM price 0 15.7 8.6 12.5 12.5 6.7 10.4 15.7 15.7 15.7 12.6 18.4
REDD price 0 0 8.6 12.5 4 6.7 10.4 15.7 15.7 4 12.6 18.4
 
 
 
Table 9 Market volumes of CDM and REDD credits (Mt CO2) 
Scenario 
Market 
IET CDM REDD REDD_ SUP 
REDD_ 
DEM 
REDD_ 
MAC 
REDD_ 
MAC+ 
REDD
EXP 
REDD_ 
SUP 
EXP 
REDD_ 
DEM 
EXP 
REDD_ 
MAC 
EXP 
REDD_ 
MAC+ 
EXP 
CDM market 
volume 0 1618.3 839.8 1277.9 1271 635 1048 1615 1618.1 1617.8
1287 1880 
REDD market 
volume 0 0 1462.9 636.3 650.1 1857 1066 2021.2 650 649.7
2635 1519 
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Table 10 Net CDM credit exports (exports less imports, Mt CO2) 
Scenario 
Region 
IET CDM REDD REDD_SUP 
REDD_DE
M 
REDD 
EXP 
REDD_SU
P 
EXP 
REDD_DE
M 
EXP 
Brazil 0 4.5 2.3 3.6 3.6 4.5 4.5 4.5
China 0 1338.3 693 1059.3 1053.4 1335.8 1338.3 1338.3
South Korea 0 48.9 25.5 38.5 38.3 48.8 48.9 48.9
Mexico 0 47 31.8 40.7 40.5 47 47 47
India 0 179.1 87.2 136.1 135.2 178.7 179.1 179.1
Annex I 
regions 0 -1618.3 -839.8 -1277.9 -1271 -1615 -1618.1 -1617.8
 
 
 
Table 11 Net REDD credit exports (exports less imports, Mt CO2) 
Scenario 
Region 
IET CDM REDD 
REDD_ 
SUP 
REDD_ 
DEM 
REDD_ 
MAC 
REDD_ 
MAC+ 
REDD
EXP 
REDD_ 
SUP 
EXP 
REDD_ 
DEM 
EXP 
REDD_ 
MAC 
EXP 
REDD_ 
MAC+ 
EXP 
Africa 0 0 1097.5 271.9 482.6 1275.9 847 1336.9 271.9 482.6 1526.6 1126.5
South-East Asia 0 0 40.7 60.3 18.6 64.8 24.4 76.2 73.6 18.6 123.3 43.8
Central America 0 0 35.5 30.4 16.3 56.6 21.3 66.6 30.4 16.3 107.8 38.2
South America 0 0 289 274 132.5 460.3 173.6 541.5 274 132.5 877.2 310.8
Annex I 
regions 0 0 -1462.9 -636.3 -650.1 -1857.6 1066.3 -2021.2 -650 -649.7 -2634.9 -1519.3
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Table 12 Core and expanded Annex I emission reduction commitments by region and scenario 
(commitments in % vs. BAU emissions in 2020) 
Scenario 
Region 
CDM REDD EXP 
REDD_SUP
EXP 
REDD_DEM 
EXP 
EU-27 27.2 44.1 32.6 32.6 
Canada 23.2 37.6 27.8 27.8 
Japan 6.4 10.4 7.7 7.7 
Former Sov. Un. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pacific OECD 25.5 41.4 30.6 30.6 
United States 24.8 40.1 29.7 29.7 
Annex I regions 19.9 32.3 23.9 23.9 
Relative 
expansion of 
commitment 
0% 62% 20% 20% 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C Simulations results for sensitivity analysis 
 
Table 13 Carbon prices by credit type and scenario (€2005 per ton of CO2) 
Scenario
Region 
BASE 
CASE REDD
REDD_ 
MAC 
REDD_ 
MAC+
REDD
EXP 
REDD_ 
MAC 
EXP 
REDD_ 
MAC+ 
EXP 
International permit 
price 15.7 8.6 6.7 10.4 15.7 12.6 18.4
CDM price 15.7 8.6 6.7 10.4 15.7 12.6 18.4
REDD price  8.6 6.7 10.4 15.7 12.6 18.4
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Table 14 Total compliance costs and economic benefits by region and scenario (million €2005) 
Scenario
Region 
BASE 
CASE REDD
REDD_ 
MAC 
REDD_ 
MAC+
REDD
EXP 
REDD_ 
MAC 
EXP 
REDD_ 
MAC+ 
EXP 
EU-27 17874.3 10415.2 8300.4 12476 30633.1 25018.7 35338.9
Canada 1659.1 1027.2 831.8 1211 3013.9 2495.5 3437.5
Japan 724.9 495.6 410.7 570 1452.3 1227.5 1626.1
Former Soviet Union -3308.6 -1173.6 -768.3 -1650 -3297.4 -2273.5 -4298.3
Pacific OECD 1499.6 898.1 717.9 1071 2606.2 2147.5 2973.5
United States 19195.1 11977.6 9697.1 14108 34843.3 28927.9 39622.6
Annex I regions 37644.4 23640.1 19189.6 27787 69251.4 57543.6 78700.3
Brazil -40.1 -11.7 -7.1 -17.6 -40 -25.6 -54.9
China -11353 -3231.1 -1939.4 -4885 -11307.8 -7214.5 -15513.4
South Korea -412.4 -119.9 -72.8 -180 -410.8 -263.3 -564.2
Mexico -495.2 -184.9 -124.1 -255 -493.6 -346 -636.8
India -1496.8 -416 -250.5 -629 -1490.4 -934.3 -2093.5
CDM regions -13798 -3963.6 -2393.9 -5967 -13742.6 -8783.7 -18862.8
Africa  -5136.8 -2505.2 -6124 -14113.1 -8805.8 -16213.2
South-East Asia  -180.4 -13.8 -194 -617.6 -58.3 -610.6
Central America  -162.7 -24.9 -171 -556.8 -95.1 -539.1
South America  -1323.8 -202.9 -1394 -4530 -773.7 -4386.1
REDD regions  -6803.7 -2746.8 -7884 -19817.5 -9732.9 -21749
 
Note: Negative compliance costs represent net economic benefits 
 
 
 
Table 15 Market volumes of CDM and REDD credits (Mt CO2) 
Scenario
Region 
BASE 
CASE REDD
REDD_ 
MAC 
REDD_ 
MAC+
REDD
EXP 
REDD_ 
MAC 
EXP 
REDD_ 
MAC+ 
EXP 
CDM market volume 1618 840 635. 1048 1618 1287 1880
REDD market volume  1463 1857 1066 2021.2 2635 1519
 
 
 
 
